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C\N May 17, 1954, the Supreme Court handed down its historic decision in
Brown v. Board of Education' which adjudged that "in the field of public
education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place."' Separate educa-
tional facilities for black and white children were said to be "inherently un-
equal"3 and violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Since that day, the Court has attempted to solve the uncountable practical
and constitutional problems raised by the implementation of Brown in no
less than twenty-eight cases4 in which it applied the equal protection clause
to varying factual situations arising in southern public school districts. Lower
courts, both state and federal, have handed down literally thousands of school
desegregation decisions.
Still, the promise of Brown has not been kept. In 1973 not only does a
majority of black students still attend predominantly black schools,' but recent
information discloses that the quality, as well as the quantity, of education
offered to blacks and other minority groups is still substantially inferior to
that offered to whites.' The reasons for this failure of courts, legislators, ad-
ministrators, school authorities, and individuals to translate the constitutional
commitment to equal educational opportunity into social reality are various
and complex.! Unfortunately these reasons are often obscured by prejudices,
half-truths, oversimplifications, and misunderstandings.
* J.D., University of Neuchatel, Switzerland; LL.M., Southern Methodist University.
Attorney at Law, Geneva, Switzerland.1347 U.S. 483 (1954).
'Id. at 495.
3Id.
4 Bradley v. School Bd., 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), aff'd per curiam by an equally
divided Court, 93 S. Ct. 1952, 36 L. Ed. 2d 771 (1973); San Antonio Ind. School Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407
U.S. 484 (1972); Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972); Moore
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 47 (1971); North Carolina State Bd. of
Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971); McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39 (1971); Davis
v. Board of School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33 (1971); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd.
of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Northcross v. Board of Educ. of the Memphis City Schools,
397 U.S. 232 (1970); Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Bd., 396 U.S. 290 (1970);
Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Bd., 396 U.S. 226 (1969); Dowell v. Board of
Educ. of the Oklahoma City Pub. Schools, 396 U.S. 269 (1969); Alexander v. Holmes
County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969); United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of
Educ., 395 U.S. 225 (1969); Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450 (1968); Raney
v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 443 (1968); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430
(1968); Rogers v. Paul, 382 U.S. 198 (1965); Bradley v. School Bd., 382 U.S. 103 (1965);
Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683
(1963); Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963); Bush v. Orleans Parish School
Bd., 364 U.S. 500 (1960); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 358 U.S. 101
(1958); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown II),
349 U.S. 294 (1955); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497( 1954).
'See SENATE SELECT COMM. ON EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, TOWARD EQUAL EDUCATION-
AL OPPORTUNITY, PARTS I AND III, S. Doc. No. 342-1, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
Old. See also NEWSWEEK, Jan. 22, 1973, at 81.
7See, e.g., SENATE SELECT COMM. ON EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 5; U.S.
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL E:NFORCEMENT OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 12-25
(1969); Richter, School Desegregation After Swann: A Theory of Government Respons-
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Several questions which, before and after Brown, have constantly been
raised in varying factual situations are: Is or should the Constitution be "color-
blind"?' Does the fourteenth amendment prohibit all racial classifications
regardless of their purpose or effect? Does it, more particularly, prevent state
and school authorities from taking race into account in the process of im-
plementing the Brown decision? This Article attempts to show that these
questions and their answers take many forms in different factual and consti-
tutional contexts.
Part I presents the issue of color blindness, its appearance on the constitu-
tional and political scene, and its impact upon the school desegregation process.
Part II analyzes this issue critically by studying it in the historical and consti-
tutional context in which it arises. Both parts are concluded with a review of
the empirical and legal arguments, pro and con. Part III shows that although
the Supreme Court in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education'
has at least attempted to answer some questions raised by the color blindness
proposition, it did not, and probably could not, bar it completely from the
field of public education. The conclusion attempts to determine why this is so.
I. COLOR-BLIND VERSUS COLOR-CONSCIOUS-THE ISSUE
A. Appearance of the Argument
Prior to the Court's landmark decision in Swann, a number of Justices had,
in various circumstances, advanced the view that the equal protection clause
invalidates any racial classification, regardless of result and purpose. The first
to propound this belief was Justice Harlan who, in his classic dissent in Plessy
v. Ferguson, expressed his interpretation of the fourteenth amendment in an
oft-quoted passage:
Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among
citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law. The
humblest is the peer of the most powerful. The law regards man as man,
and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights
as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved."
Today, this felicitous metaphor must be interpreted against the background
of open racism sanctioned by the law at that time. It clearly relates to the
deliberate use of racial criteria for purposes of invidious discrimination. The
first Justice Harlan certainly did not foresee the purposes his aphorism was
going to be used for some sixty years later. Whatever Harlan would have
thought of the school desegregation decisions of his successors, his constitu-
tional abstraction constitutes an easy catchword for advocates of a per se con-
stitutional prohibition of classifications based upon race.
ibility, 39 U. CHI. L. REy. 421 (1972); Note, Schools, Busing and Desegregation: The
Post-Swann Era, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1078 (1971).
The expression was first used by Mr. Justice Harlan in his dissent in Plessy v. Fer-
guson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896).
9402 U.S. 1 (1971).
10 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896). The Court upheld a Louisiana statute requiring separate




In his concurring opinion in Edwards v, California," Mr. Justice Jackson
stated that race was a "neutral fact" and should be "constitutionally an ir-
relevance."" This has been interpreted as an affirmance on his part of the
per se prohibition rule.' The same has been said of Mr. Justice Rutledge's
dissent in Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Commissioners: "Classifications
based on the purpose to be accomplished may be said abstractly to be sound.
But when the test.., in fact is race or consanguinity, it cannot be used con-
stitutionally to bar all except a group chosen by such a relationship from public
employment. That is not a test; it is a wholly arbitrary exercise of power."'4
Some commentators found this language to mean an implicit acceptance by
the dissenter of the "forbidden classification doctrine."'5
In Bell v. Maryland,"6 a case involving peaceful sit-in demonstrations in res-
taurants not serving blacks, Justice Goldberg used the term "color-blind" to
express his conviction that the Constitution prohibits American citizens from
being denied access to public accommodations solely because of their race
and color.'
A decade after Brown, Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Douglas, in
McLaughlin v. Florida said with regard to a Florida statute which prohibited
the interracial cohabitation of unmarried couples in the nighttime: "I cannot
conceive of a valid legislative purpose under our Constitution for a state
law which makes the color of a person's skin the test of whether his conduct
is a criminal offense."" Conceding that the equal protection clause might
tolerate a law establishing racially segregated public records "for a statistical
or other valid public purpose" he continued: "I think it is simply not possible
for a state law to be valid under our Constitution which makes the criminality
11314 U.S. 160 (1941). The Court struck down a California statute designed to pre-
vent nonresident indigents from entering the state. The majority based its opinion on the
commerce clause. Id. at 174. Justices Douglas, Black, Murphy, and Jackson concurred on
the ground that the fundamental right to travel freely from one state to another, a privilege
of national citizenship, was abridged by the statute. Id.
Ild. at 185.
"Developments in the Law--Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1088 n.65
(1969).
14330 U.S. 552, 565 (1947). A Louisiana piloting law requiring 6-month apprentice-
ships under incumbent pilots who, having a large discretion, selected only relatives and
friends of incumbents as apprentices, was upheld by the Court as being not an unreasonable
exercise of the police power. Justices Rutledge, Reed, Douglas, and Murphy dissented.
" Tussman & tenroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341,
354-55 (1949); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra note 13, at 1088 n.62.
But see Elden, "Forty Acres and A Mule" with Interest: The Constitutionality of Black
Capitalism, Benign School Quotas and Other Statutory Racial Classifications, 47 J. URB.
L. 591, 609 n.76 (1969).
16378 U.S. 226 (1964). The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of ap-
peals, and affirmed the trespass conviction of the 12 Negro students for their participation
in a sit-in demonstration.
17 "The dissent argues that the Constitution permits American citizens to be denied
access to places of public accommodation solely because of their race or color. Such a view
does not do justice to a Constitution which is color blind and to the Court's decision [in
Brown) which affirmed the right of all Americans to public equality." 378 U.S. 226,
287-88 (1964). Justice Black, dissenting, answered to that point: "We agree, of course,
that the Fourteenth Amendment is 'color blind' in the sense that it outlaws all state laws
which discriminate merely on account of color. This was the basis upon which the Court
struck down laws requiring school segregation [in Brown]." Id. at 342-43 n.42.
16379 U.S. 184, 198 (1964). Asserting that the Fourteenth Amendment rendered racial
classifications "constitutionally suspect," the majority refused to recognize an "overriding
statutory purpose" which alone would justify a racial classification of this kind.
[Vol. 27
PUBLIC SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
of an act depend upon the race of the actor, discrimination of that kind is
invidious per se.""
Concurring again in a 1967 decision in which the Court struck down Vir-
ginia's miscegenation statutes," Justice Stewart referred simply to his opinion
in McLaughlin. The majority, speaking through Chief Justice Warren, seemed
to make a distinction between racial classifications in criminal statutes and all
other classifications based upon race:
[Tihe Equal Protection Clause demands that racial classifications, especially
suspect in criminal statutes, be subjected to the 'most rigid scrutiny' . . . and,
if they are ever to be upheld, they must be shown to be necessary to the
accomplishment of some permissible state objective, independent of the racial
discrimination which it was the object of the Fourteenth Amendment to
eliminate."
Can this language be interpreted, as one commentator did,"2 as an implicit
holding of the Court that all racial classifications" may be unconstitutional
per se? It has to be seriously doubted that the majority would have included
any "benign" racial classifications in referring to a possible per se prohibition
rule. It is more likely that the Justices had in mind other invidious classifica-
tions by race."4
Whatever might be argued about the "real intentions" of the different
Justices in deciding the cited cases, it is an indisputable fact that the color
blindness argument has never been explicitly accepted as a constitutional
doctrine by a majority of the Court.'
However, between the landmark case of Brown v. Board of Education and
the Swann decision, a number of commentators" advanced the view that the
Court had implicitly adhered to the per se rule. Brown, according to this argu-
ment, held that state-enforced segregation of children in public schools solely
on the basis of their race or color violates the equal protection clause of the
19 Id.
20 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).2
1 ld. at 11.
2 Vieira, Racial Imbalance, Black Separatism, and Permissible Classification by Race,
67 MICH. L. REv. 1553, 1595-96 (1969). The author concluded, however, that "in the
face of contrary precedent and in the absence of reasoned discussion . . . [Loving offered]
virtually no guidance at all for cases involving 'non-invidious' uses of racial criteria." Id.
at 1596.
2"See text accompanying notes 75-76 infra.
ImE.g., a city charter which sets up a different, more complex procedure of lawmaking
for statutes dealing with rental or sale or real property relating to race. Hunter v. Erikson,
393 U.S. 385 (1969). For another invidious racial classification recently struck down by
the Court, see Nyquist v. Lee, 318 F. Supp. 710 (W.D.N.Y. 1970), a/f'd mem., 402 U.S.
935 (1971).
23Justice Harlan formulated his famous color blind doctrine in a dissenting opinion and
both Justices Stewart and Douglas took part in Swann, where a unanimous Court at least
implicitly rejected such a doctrine.
26347 U.S. 483 (1954).
21p. KAUPER, FRONTIERS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY 219 (1956); Kaplan, Segre-
gation Litigation and the Schools-Part I: The New Rochelle Experience, 58 Nw. U.L.
REV. 1, 22 (1963); Kaplan, Segregation Litigation and the Schools-Part 11: The General
Northern Problem, 58 Nw. U.L. REV. 157, 173 (1963); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Prin-
ciples of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 32 (1959). See also Bittker, The Case
of the Checker-Board Ordinance: An Experiment in Race Relations, 71 YALE L.J. 1387,
1391-92 (1962); St. Antoine, Color Blindness but Not Myopia: A New Look at State Ac-
tion, Equal Protection and "Private" Racial Discrimination, 59 MICH. L. REv. 993 (1961).
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fourteenth amendment. Although the Court put great weight on the im-
portance of equal educational opportunity, it insisted upon the injurious effect
of state-enforced segregations upon the minority group:
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental
effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction
of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as
denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the
motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore,
has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of negro
children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a
racial[ly] integrated school system .... [T]his finding is amply supported by
modern authority."
Of course, the mere inequality of schools does not involve any per se
constitutional violation. Concluding that "separate educational facilities are
inherently unequal"" the Court implied that this inequality was brought about
by a state-imposed separation of black and white children, in other words, by
a racial classification.
Few contend"0 that Brown itself held all racial classifications unconstitutional
per se. Such an interpretation is indeed difficult to justify, especially since
Brown's companion case, Bolling v. Sharpe,' held segregation of pupils in
the public schools of the District of Columbia a discrimination which "may
be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process,""2 and explicitly found
racial classification "contrary to our traditions and hence constitutionally
suspect,"" but not unconstitutional per se.
However, beginning in 1956, the argument appeared again with more
strength, when, in a series of per curiam decisions," the Court struck down
racial segregation in public golf courses, 5 public beaches' and parks,"7 buses,"
and, some years later, in courtrooms and prisons."0 If Brown were based at
least partly on the denial of equality of educational opportunity in segregated
public schools, and if all the subsequent per curiam cases invalidated segrega-
tion of public facilities by a simple reference to Brown, there must necessarily
be some showing of inequality and of a resulting injurious effect upon the
blacks from segregation on beaches, in buses, on golf courses, and so forth.
Thus, it must be demonstrated that all blacks are injured through use of
segregated golf courses and beaches as much as black children are injured in
88347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
21 Id. at 495.
"0But see the recent interpretations given in a speech by Senator Byrd, School Busing
and Forced Integration: A Dissenting Opinion, in VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY, Oct. 15,
1971, at 10, and Senator Ervin in Hearings on the Status of School Desegregation Law
Before the Senate Select Comm. on Equal Educational Opportunity, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 11, at 5406-07 (1971).
31 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
12 Id. at 499.
33 1d.
"Wechsler, supra note 27, at 22, 23, severely criticized this use of per curiam decisions.
'
5 Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955).
'"Mayor & City Council v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1956).
"
7New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958).
38 Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
1Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963).
'
8 Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
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segregated public schools. And if, the argument continues, this difficult dem-
onstration cannot be made successfully, we have to interpret the Brown decision
in the light of the subsequent per curiam cases and come, necessarily, to the
conclusion that Brown, Boiling, and the per curiam cases simply, but strictly,
prohibit any classification based upon race.41 In other words, Harlan's powerful
dissent in Plessy has, after almost sixty years, implicitly become the unanimous
opinion of the Supreme Court. Differences in race may no longer justify a
different treatment by the law. Race as an "unalterable trait over which an
individual has not control"' becomes an illegitimate criterion for govern-
mental action.
At the first glance, the argument seems fair and promising. The law, for a
long time, subjected the Negroes to a brutal and dehumanizing system of
slavery. Monstrous civil, social, and political inequalities enjoyed the full
sanction of law for almost 200 years. In such a society, the credo of those,
blacks and whites, who want to put an end to two centuries of injustice can
be only: "[Tlhe law ... shall be the same for the black as for the white; ...
all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws .... ."
In order "to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law,""
no "legislative body or judicial tribunal may have regard to the race of citizens
when the civil rights of those citizens are involved."' It was the object of the
Civil War Amendments to remove "the race line from our governmental
system,"" and it took the Supreme Court more than fifty years finally to in-
terpret the Constitution as prohibiting racial classifications, according to the
above-mentioned view of Brown.
The apparent logic and simplicity of the argument has had little effect upon
the Supreme Court's more recent decisions. The Court has not altered its
position that racial classifications are: "in most circumstances irrelevant,"'47
but "not wholly beyond the limits of the Constitution";" "subject . . . to the
most rigid scrutiny"'" but may be justified by "pressing public necessity";"
"contrary to our traditions and hence constitutionally suspect"'" such that only
an overriding statutory purpose and not simple rationality may justify them."
Before attempting to scrutinize the color blindness proposition, its under-
41 See P. KAUPER, supra note 27, at 218-19:
[The] per curiam decisions . . . make it safe to predict that the Court will
be inevitably carried by the force of its decision to outlaw all segregation
legislation and to adopt the Harlan view that the Constitution is color-blind,
and that no classifications based on race or color can be accepted consistent
with the imperative of Equal Protection. . . . Classification based on race no
longer has a place under our Constitution.
'Developments in the Law--Equal Protection, supra note 13, at 1127.
"Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307 (1880).
"Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896).
'Id. at 554-55 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
11 Id. at 555.4 7 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
48 Id. at 101.
"'Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
"Old. In these instances, known as the Japanese Relocation Cases, the Supreme Court
upheld an 8 p.m. curfew imposed on enemy aliens and persons of Japanese ancestry as well
as a statute which excluded these persons from certain West Coast areas as a valid exercise
of the National Government's war power.
"Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
"Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
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lying assumptions, and future implications, and determine if and to what
extent Swann really put an end to it, it is necessary to examine briefly its
practical impact upon the school desegregation process.
B. Impact Upon the School Desegregation Process
Seventeen years after Brown v. Board of Education condemned state-im-
posed segregation by race in public schools, the Supreme Court acknowledged
that "[nlothing in our national experience prior to 1955 prepared anyone
for dealing with changes and adjustments of the magnitude and complexity
encountered since then."" Certainly, desegregation problems are not solved
even today. There can be no doubt that Brown was decided within the frame-
work of the "state action" doctrine.' Although it held that "[s]egregation ...
has a detrimental effect upon the colored children" and that separate educa-
tional facilities are inherently unequal,"5 it cannot be read as holding uncon-
stitutional all segregation whether state-imposed or accidental.' The problem
of so-called "de facto segregation," which is the result of the assignment of
pupils to their neighborhood school in areas with residential segregation, was
not present in Brown.
Until recently, ' the Supreme Court has consistently denied certiorari in
school desegregation cases which raise the uneasy questions of the constitu-
tionality of de facto segregation, 8 or of the limits of governmental responsi-
bility for public school segregation." Another important point which the
Supreme Court has not yet decided clearly is the question of when a dual
school system is sufficiently desegregated so as to be unitary in the sense of
the Court's more recent decisions. °
The proposition that the fourteenth amendment prohibits the use of color
as a basis for governmental decision affects not only the choice of the per-
missible tools of school authorities essential to "eliminate from the public
schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation," 1 but also the constitutionality
of their voluntary efforts to dismantle dual school systems and to achieve
racial balance in circumstances of de facto segregation.
53402 U.S. 1, 13 (1971).
"The Constitution is only violated when the equal protection of the laws is denied by
state legislation, or some other state involvement. This concept has been constantly broad-
ened since the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). See Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Smith v. All-
wright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). Cornpare Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966), with
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
55347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
"
8 See, e.g., Note, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education: Roadblocks to
the Implementation of Brown, 12 WM. & MARY L. REV. 838 (1971).
" Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 445 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 404 U.S.
1036 (1972) (No. 71-507).
"
8 E.g., Davis v. School Dist., 443 F.2d 573 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 913(1971); Downs v. Board of Educ., 336 F.2d 988 (10th Cit. 1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 914 (1965); Taylor v. Board of Educ., 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
940 (1961).59 Bradley v. School Bd., 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), aff'd per curiam by an equally
divided Court, 93 S. Ct. 1952, 36 L. Ed. 2d 771 (1973).
"
0 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1971); Alexander
v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969); Green v. County School Bd.,
391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968); Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case--Its Significance for
Northern School Desegregation, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 697 (1971).1Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971).
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De lure Segregation. In the de jure context, the issue can be framed this way:
Once a determination has been made of whether a constitutional violation
consisting of racial segregation has occurred, what does the equal protection
clause require the state and school authorities to do in order to comply with
the mandate of Brown? Advocates of the color blindness rule would argue
that the fourteenth amendment itself limits the states' power to remedy a
past violation of the fourteenth amendment. In response to those who ask
school authorities and courts to take race into account in shaping a remedy
for the constitutional violatio 6 they argue that "two wrongs will not make
a right"" and that a constitutional offense cannot properly be corrected by
unconstitutional means. But, the other side responds, the constitutionality of
racial classifications cannot be decided independently of their result and effect.
Brown unequivocally prohibited only invidious discrimination and left open
the question of benign racial classifications!4 and, a fortiori, the problem of
"compensatory" or "preferential treatment." But what if compensatory dis-
crimination in favor of one group entails an invidious discrimination against
another? Who decides what classifications are "benign" or "invidious"? As will
be seen, the courts have attempted to answer almost all of these questions.
It is, nevertheless, interesting to note the far-reaching implications of the
color blindness proposition.
De Facto Segregation. Where racial imbalance" results not from deliberate
segregation of the races, but from adherence to a racially neutral student
assignment policy in a community with segregation in residential patterns,
the question is somewhat different: Absent a previous violation of the Con-
stitution, does the equal protection clause permit school authorities to put an
end to de facto segregation and to achieve racial balance? Is the elimination
of racial imbalance a valid governmental concern? If it is, do the state legis-
62 E.g., to assign pupils on a racial as opposed to geographical basis by quota require-
ments for individual schools, gerrymandering of school district lines, "pairing" of schools,
consolidating school districts, transportation of students, etc. See Swann v. Charlotte-Meck-
lenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Bradley v. School Bd., 338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D.
Va.), rev'd, 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), afl'd per curiam by an equally divided Court,
93 S. Ct. 1952, 36 L. Ed. 2d 771 (1973).
63 Senator Byrd, supra note 30, at 10.
" See, e.g., Goldman, Benign Racial Classifications: A Constitutional Dilemma, 35 U.
IN. L. REv. 349 (1966); Vieira, supra note 22.
' See, e.g., Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World-Equality for the Negro-The
Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 363 (1966); McAuliffe, School Desegre-
gation: The Problem of Compensatory Discrimination, 57 VA. L. REV. 65 (1971); Wright,
Public School Desegregation: Legal Remedies for De Facto Segregation, 16 W. RES. L.
REV. 478 (1965).
66 When the population of a community, or a public school system is predomi-
nantly Negro, a school can be predominantly Negro and yet not be con-
sidered racially imbalanced. Moreover, a predominantly white school is not
deemed racially imbalanced when the proportion of Negroes in the school
substantially exceeds the proportion of Negro children in all of the public
schools of the same grade level in the community. Although the proportion
of Negroes in such a school may exceed the proportion of Negro children in
all of the public schools of the same grade level, common usage does not apply
the term 'racially imbalanced' unless the school is also predominantly Negro,
for only when a school is both predominantly Negro and literally imbalanced
is it viewed as a segregated school.
Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARv. L.
REv. 564, 564-65 (1965).
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lators or school authorities have power to classify by race to achieve racial
balance? It is in this context, to which the Supreme Court has not yet spoken,"7
that the color blindness argument has its greatest and most far-reaching impact.
If the view prevails that governmental decisions cannot be influenced by racial
considerations, all efforts of school authorities to eliminate or alleviate racial
imbalance would be unconstitutional.
The precedents of the lower courts all point in one direction. While several
cases hold that, in the absence of discrimination, school boards have no affirma-
tive duty to correct de facto segregation, " state statutes requiring or permitting
boards to alleviate racial imbalance, 9 as well as the school authorities' own
determination to do so, have constantly been upheld by state"0 and lower federal
courts.
71
There is little doubt that the extreme view that all racial classifications are
unconstitutional will never be adopted as such by any court. The question is
one of the scope of judicial review: Is the benign racial classification "con-
stitutionally suspect" and, therefore, subject to the strict standard of review
which requires the state to prove a compelling interest for classifying racially,"m
or is the test simply one of reasonableness?"3
Furthermore, if racial imbalance is unavoidable because of the uniracial
composition of the community, can the state be required to act affirmatively
to aid the disadvantaged children by providing "compensatory education suf-
ficient at least to overcome the detriment of [de facto] segregation"? '
One can see that the color blindness idea, advocated either as a pure and
simple constitutional prohibition of any racial classification or attenuated in
the requirement that the courts strictly scrutinize such classifications, even if
they are intended to be favorable to the disadvantaged minority, constitutes
a serious challenge to all aspects of the long process of school desegregation.
C. Color Blindness: Empirical and Legal Arguments Pro
"Benign racial classifications" and "compensatory treatment" of disadvan-
"But see Bradley v. School Bd., 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), afl'd per curiam by
an equally divided Court, 93 S. Ct. 1952, 36 L. Ed. 2d 771 (1973); Keyes v. School Dist.
No. 1, 445 F.2d 990 (10th Cit. 1971), cert. granted, 404 U.S. 1036 (1972) (No. 71-507).
" Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cit. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
847 (1967); Springfield School Comm. v. Barksdale, 348 F.2d 261 (1st Cit. 1965); Downs
v. Board of Educ., 336 F.2d 988 (10th Cit. 1964); Bell v. School City of Gary, 324 F.2d
209 (7th Cit. 1963).
"'See Tometz v. Board of Educ., 39 Ill. 2d 593, 237 N.E.2d 498 (1968); School Comm.
v. Board of Educ., 352 Mass. 693, 227 N.E.2d 729 (1967), appeal dismissed, 389 U.S.
572 (1968).
7"E.g., Vetere v. Allen, 15 N.Y.2d 259, 206 N.E.2d 174, 258 N.Y.S.2d 77, cert. de-
nied, 382 U.S. 825 (1965); Balaban v. Rubin, 14 N.Y.2d 193, 199 N.E.2d 375, 250
N.Y.S.2d 281, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 881 (1964).
"'E.g., Olson v. Board of Educ., 250 F. Supp. 1000 (E.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed,
367 F.2d 565 (2d Cit. 1966); Offermann v. Nitkowski, 248 F. Supp. 129 (W.D.N.Y.
1965), aff'd, 378 F.2d 22 (2d Cit. 1967); Fuller v. Volk, 230 F. Supp. 25 (D.N.J. 1964),
vacated on other grounds, 351 F.2d 323 (3d Cit. 1965).
2See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184
(1964).
"See Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911); Tometz v. Board of
Educ., 39 Ill. 2d 593, 237 N.E.2d 498 (1968); School Comm. v. Board of Educ., 352
Mass. 693, 227 N.E.2d 729 (1967), appeal dismissed, 389 U.S. 572 (1968).
"
4See Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 515 (D.D.C. 1967), af/'d sub nom. Smuck
v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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taged minorities have been justified by commentators:5 and upheld by courts7'
as constitutional means "to prevent discrimination being perpetuated and to
undo the effects of past discrimination.""' Viewed from this perspective, Justice
Harlan's aphorism, far from prohibiting racial classifications per se, embodies
no more than the principle of a constitutional prohibition of racial discrimina-
tion, and is clearly violated when blacks are singled out in order to separate
them from the dominant race or to impose burdens, restrictions, or obligations
upon them. But as a valid exercise of the legitimate governmental purpose
of realizing effectively the fourteenth amendment's principle of equality, benign
racial classifications, and even compensatory treatment, do not necessarily
fall within the reach of this prohibition. In other words, the constitutionality
of racial classifications can only be determined by looking at the objective
they serve and the result they produce.
Still, as will be demonstrated, there are strong arguments against the
benevolent use of racial criteria by the state. Implicitly, if not explicitly, these
arguments tend to support the view that, in spite of all the social and political
inequalities of our society, government can be but neutral with respect to such
dangerous criteria as race or color. Notwithstanding these inequalities, the
Constitution should be color-blind.
The different arguments which follow are based less on legal than on
policy considerations. But one must realize that, "in this area . . . there is
very little difference between the constitutional and the policy approaches."7
First, it is argued, a statute which treats individuals differently solely on the
basis of race violates the constitutional principle that "[tihe rights created by
the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed
to the individual. The rights established are personal rights ..... " It is evident
that the fourteenth amendment does not require the government to treat all
persons alike; but unless there is a relevant distinction between individuals,
they should not be treated differently. Race and color," any more than wealth,81
alienage, 2 residence,"8 sex,"' or status of birth," should not be relevant to a
legitimate governmental purpose. Under a strict interpretation of the rule,
benevolent programs would violate "fundamental notions of individualism""
1 See, e.g., Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts,
78 HARV. L. REv. 564 (1965); Fiss, supra note 60; Wright, supra note 65.
7E.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971), and com-
panion cases; United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cit. 1966),
afl'd en banc, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
'1372 F.2d 836, 876 (5th Cir. 1966).
78 Kaplan, supra note 65, at 381.
"'Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948). See also McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F.
Ry., 235 U.S. 151, 161-62 (1914): "[The essence of the constitutional right [of equal
protection] is that it is a personal one. . . . It is the individual who is entitled to the
equal protection of the laws ....
"
0 E.g., Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
" Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). But see San Antonio Ind.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
S"Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
"
3 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
"Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
" Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
68 (1968).
"Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra note 13, at 1111.
1973]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
by treating persons differently according to their race.
A second important objection to this kind of racial classification is that it
weakens the role of law as an educative force.87 The inconsistency of asserting
on one hand that race is generally irrelevant and on the other that it is, never-
theless, in some circumstances important is likely to create both confusion and
distrust in the sincerity of government and law. Law should constantly attempt
to shape the behavior of its subjects in a way which eventually will bring
about a completely color-blind society, in which past social inequalities are
erased and individuals are not judged by their color but by their worth. "[Iln
the completely color-blind world of the future, the educative force of principled
action by the government in the racial area may no longer be important. In
today's world, however, constant education in color blindness is essential.. 8
The general interest of law in promoting every principle necessary and proper
to bring about this ideal society in a future not too remote outweighs the
particular interest of satisfying the immediate needs of the disadvantaged
groups.
In administering a benevolent program which treats persons differently on
the basis of their race, the government has no choice but to determine the
race to which individuals belong. This "dirty business" ' of determining an
individual's race is both morally degrading and scientifically difficult, for
it seems that "the concept of the American Negro is a social concept and not
a biological one";"° social scientists are capable only of roughly classifying
groups according to race, but not of classifying individuals." However courts
resolve this problem, they will have to adopt one definition or another. Looking
for precedents, they will verify that "the only real experts on determining who
is a Negro are the racists .... 2 Southern legislators9 and courts" have had a
long experience in handling this, and have used a variety of tests.
There are other sources which might be drawn upon, such as the apartheid
classifications used in South Africa"5 today, or the definition of the aboriginals
8" Kaplan, supra note 65, at 379-80; Vieira, supra note 22, at 1614-15; Developmerts
in the Law-Equal Protection, supra note 13, at 1113.
8 Kaplan, sapra note 65, at 380.
89 Bittker, supra note 27, at 1422.8
°G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 136 (1944).
1See generally Bittker, supra note 27, at 1421; Elden, supra note 15, at 607.
92 Kaplan, supra note 65, at 379.
"E.g., "[AIll negroes, mulattoes, mesticoes, and their descendants, having any African
blood in their veins, shall be known in this state as 'persons of color.'" Ch. 40, § 1,
[1865-66] Tenn. Laws 65. Arkansas relied on appearance: "Persons in whom there is
visible any distinct admixture of African blood shall, for purposes of this act, be deemed
to belong to the African race." No. 17, S 4, [1891] Ark. Acts 17. A Georgia statute, as
late as 1927, was even more generous: "All negroes, mulattoes, mesticoes, and their de-
scendants, having any ascertainable trace of either Negro or African, West Indian, or Asiatic
Indian blood in their veins, and all descendants of any person having either Negro or
African, West Indian, or Asiatic Indian blood in his or her veins, shall be known in this
state as persons of color." No. 317 [1927) Ga. Laws 272.
"Daniel v. Guy, 19 Ark. 121 (1857); ci. People v. Dean, 14 Mich. 406 (1866);
Monroe v. Collins, 17 Ohio 665 (1867); and, for a more recent decision, Miller v. Allen,
104 Okla. 39, 229 P. 152 (1924). The Supreme Court was somewhat more decent in Al-
berry v. United States, 162 U.S. 499, 501 (1896).
According to the Population Registration Act No. 30 of 1950, § 1, the population of
South Africa is to be classified as White, Coloured, or Native:
(a) a 'White' person means a person who in appearance obviously is, or who
is generally accepted as, a white person, but does not include a person who,
[Vol. 27
PUBLIC SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
adopted by Australian legislators." In any event, awkward problems are likely
to be presented to the courts and one would certainly agree that the law should
avoid litigating the race of an individual.
Assuming that racial classifications are unconstitutional if designed to keep
minority groups in an inferior social and political position, but permissible if
beneficially motivated, the crucial question arises as to what constitutes "be-
nign" or "benevolent" and what constitutes "hostile" treatment. As attitudes
change, what seems benign today may be regarded as invidious tomorrow. Fur-
thermore, minority groups tend to be no more homogeneous than the dominant
majority, particularly with regard to measures which single them out on the
basis of their distinctive features. It is not surprising, therefore, that the black
community has always been," and still is,"8 deeply divided over the question of
integration. An increasing number of radical groups reject it violently as a
subterfuge for the maintenance of white supremacy, a threat to their cultural
heritage, and a recuperative technique of the establishment. Yet their demands
for "autonomous" black studies and "community control" deserve a careful
constitutional analysis free of misleading emotions."9 Others, without rejecting
the principle of integration as such, might assert that for them as individuals
a particular desegregation program represents a burden and not a favor."
although in appearance obviously a white person, is generally accepted as
a Coloured person; (b) a 'Native' means a person who in fact is, or is gen-
erally accepted as a member of any aboriginal race or tribe of Africa; (c) a
'Coloured' person means a person who is not a 'white' person or a 'native.'
See INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, SOUTH AFRICA AND THE RULE OF LAW
22 (1960). For a review of the abuses and practical difficulties arising from this legislation,
see E. BROOKES, APARTHEID--A DOCUMENTARY STUDY OF MODERN SOUTH AFRICA 22-25
(1968).
9"E.g., The Aboriginals Preservation and Protection Acts, 1939-46, § 5 (2), 1 QUEENS-
LAND STATUTES 10-11 (1962 Reprint) (Austl.):
Definition of aboriginals. The following persons shall be and be deemed
to be 'aboriginals' within the meaning of this Act, namely-(i) Any abo-
riginal native of the mainland of Australia or of any islands in the territorial
jurisdiction of Australia; (ii) Any person who has a preponderance of the
blood of aboriginals as defined in paragraph (i) hereof; (iii) Any half-blood
declared by a judge or police magistrate or two or more justices after trial
to be in need of the protection of this Act, and who is ordered to be so pro-
tected; (iv) Any half-blood who lives as wife or husband with an aboriginal
as hereinbefore defined, or who habitually associates with aboriginals as so
defined; (v) Any resident of a reserve other than an official or person au-
thorised by the protector; (vi) A child living on a reserve with a mother who
is an aboriginal as hereinbefore defined: Provided that an islander shall not
be deemed to be an 'aboriginal' within the meaning of this Act unless he is
residing on a reserve.
" Compare the radical views of Frederick Douglass with the moderate theories of Wil-
liam Lloyd Garrison in the 1840's in W. FOSTER, THE NEGRO PEOPLE IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 126-29 (1970); compare the later theory of the "Tuskegee Idea" of Booker T.
Washington with the "Niagara Movement" led by William E.B. DuBois, in THE CIVIL
RIGHTS RECORD, BLACK AMERICANS AND THE LAw, 1849-1970, at 110-114 (R. Bardolph
ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Bardolph].
" Compare the nonviolent "strength through love" doctrine of Dr. Martin Luther King
with the harder line of James Baldwin and Le Roi Jones, and especially with the violent,
revolutionary cries of Malcolm X, Eldridge Cleaver, Stokely Carmichael, and George Jack-
son. Bardolph 333-52. Today there seems to be a lack of leadership in the black community.
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 19, 1973, at 33.
"See, e.g., Vieira, supra note 22, at 1618-25.
1'"See Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Bd. of Educ., 298 F. Supp. 213 (D. Conn. 1969),
afl'd, 423 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1970), where black plaintiffs alleged that closing an all-black




The judicial task of deciding if differential treatment can be objectively re-
garded as benevolent is certainly not an easy one, and it has been doubted that
this question will ever lend itself to objective judicial resolution. '
Some commentators have tried to demonstrate that the double standard of
prohibiting invidious racial classifications and permitting or even requiring
compensatory discrimination to overcome the effects of past discrimination is a
double-edged sword.' 2 Again one is reminded that the equal protection clause
confers rights to persons and not to groups. According to this principle, any
benevolent school quota denies equal protection to those students, black and
white, who are refused admission on the grounds that their presence would
destroy the required racial balance." The objection follows a simple but con-
vincing logic: "To extend a right to some is by implication to deny it to
similarly situated persons to whom it is not extended."'0 4 For those individuals
who are denied admission to a particular school solely because they are black
or white, it is little comfort to know that they are heroically sacrificing their
own constitutional rights for the alleged benefit of their respective racial
group. They would not agree that they alone should pay the price for the
past inequalities imposed on the Negro race.
Hence, it appears that a strict administration of a program which dis-
criminates in favor of one group, often, if not always, entails discrimination
against another group. It is submitted that the best and perhaps the only
solution to this dilemma would be a return to the color blindness rule.
It is generally assumed that it is the white majority which has to bear the
expense of compensatory treatment granted to Negroes. But is such a program
still justified if it can be shown that discrimination in favor of the Negroes
brings additional discrimination against other equally underprivileged minority
groups? American Indians, Mexican-Americans, Puerto Ricans and, to a lesser
extent, Orientals, suffer from similar deprivations for very much the same
reasons as Negroes.
It has been convincingly demonstrated that, at least in the area of employ-
ment, these groups and not the middle class whites assume the major burdens
of any preference given to Negroes.' Moreover, the line between those who
participate in the benefits of our society and those who suffer from it is not
necessarily a racial line. Poor whites in Appalachia, for instance, or in metro-
politan areas, are no better off than Negroes, and can no more be expected to
pay the price for the compensatory treatment granted to Negroes than can
other minority groups. In fact, unless they also receive preferential treatment,
all these underprivileged groups would vigorously oppose any such program,
with a resulting dangerous growth of racial tension.
If the social sciences can prove'beyond any reasonable doubt that the present
201 Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra note 13, at 1114.
'McAuliffe, supra note 65; Vieira, supra note 22, at 1612-13.
103 "A benevolent school quota of seventy whites to thirty blacks . . . is open to criti-
cism, not only on the abstract ground that in principle it is indistinguishable from tokenism,
but also because it discriminates solely on the basis of color against both the seventy-first
white student and the thirty-first Negro student." Vieira, supra note 22, at 1612. See also
McAuliffe, supra note 65, at 79.
101 Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra note 13, at 1110-11.
10 Kaplan, supra note 65, at 373-74.
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inequality of educational opportunity is not solely or primarily the result of
racial factors, it would certainly be erroneous to use racial classifications to
achieve equal educational opportunity. The two most authoritative surveys
in this area" 6 are interpreted very differently by both social scientists and
legal scholars. Some read them as demonstrating that mere racial integration
of schools will bring about better performances of black students as com-
pared to their respective performances in all-black or overwhelmingly white
schools. °7 Others insist that the problem is one of socio-economic class
and not of race.' The Coleman Report stated that "the apparent bene-
ficial effect of a student body with a high proportion of white students
comes not from racial composition per se, but from the better educational
background and higher educational aspirations that are, on the average,
found among white students."'0 9 Some emphasize that classifications based on
socio-economic class would better serve the goal of equal educational oppor-
tunity and that benign racial classifications create more problems than they
solve. This view is supported by the somewhat disappointing experiences with
compensatory education programs."0 Moreover, the Coleman Report failed to
establish a causal relationship between the social and racial background of a
student's classmates and higher achievements; it merely suggests an association
between the two."' Therefore, its findings must not be exaggerated. The argu-
ment logically concludes that no court should require, and no school board
initiate, any compensatory program until its effectiveness has been conclusively
proved by scientific data.
Finally, the most important objection to any differential treatment because
of race is probably that such treatment, even if benevolently intended, still
implies the inferiority of the classified group.
No man, woman, or child likes to be singled out as needing special assistance;
every individual wants to stand on his own two feet, and compensatory treat-
ment beyond a certain point is an affront to pride and an insult to dignity.
Particularly this is so when race is involved, and each minor example of
preference is a continued reminder of racial differentiation."'
Assessments of capacities, achievements, or needs of underprivileged minority
groups are usually based upon the values and value-measuring system of the
dominant white majority. The conclusion that some groups need special care
and special treatment in order to reach the desired standard might well be
viewed by beneficiaries of such treatment as somewhat hypocritical and
paternalistic. Equality includes the right of self-determination of goals and of
'O'OFFICE OF EDUCATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE,
EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966) (hereinafter cited as Coleman Report];
UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIC
SCHOOLS (1967) [hereinafter cited as Commission Report].
"'i E.g., REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 427
(Bantam ed. 1967); Elden, supra note 15, at 640.
10 Freund, Civil Rights and the Limits of Law, 14 BUFF. L. REV. 199, 204 (1964);
McAuliffe, supra note 65, at 82-83.
109 Coleman Report 307.
"'a Commission Report 138. See generally Wolf, Civil Rights and Social Science Data,
RACE, Oct. 1972, at 155.
"' Wolf, supra note 110, at 168.
"' Kaplan, supra note 65, at 376-77 n.31, quoting H. MARCUSE, EQUALITY 170 (1965).
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the means by which to attain those goals. It does not include being told what
their needs and aspirations are, or what "preferential treatment" they are to
enjoy. The underlying assumption that blacks are simply not capable of finding
their appropriate place in the mainstream of American society is likely to
give support to and reinforce private racial prejudice which will be difficult,
if not impossible, to eliminate.
These are some of the most important arguments against the governmental
use of race as a criterion for differential treatment of individuals. They may
explain why the color blindness proposition cannot easily be disarmed with
"compensation-for-past-inequalities" arguments, and why it constantly reap-
pears wherever remedies to racial problems are discussed. However, a critical
view of its historical origin, purposes, and implications will show that there
are at least equally strong arguments against it. The balance of pro and con
should provide a valid basis for determining to what extent the color blindness
argument is relevant to future school desegregation cases.
II. CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE COLOR
BLINDNESS PROPOSITION
A. The Courts and the Color Blindness
Argument 1954-1971
The first school desegregation decisions11' must be read and interpreted
against a historical background of open color consciousness. Not until these
other decisions gave real meaning to the equal protection clause did the idea
appear that the clause itself might contain an inherent restriction upon means
intended to aid in the realization of its command.
Condemning separate educational facilities as inherently unequal, the War-
ren Court made a major effort to translate the general and still somewhat
dormant equality provision of the Constitution into social reality. It did not
deal with what today is labeled de facto segregation, but was concerned only
with state-enforced segregation."4 Likewise, it did not give an answer to the
abstract and, at that time, academic question of color blindness, but rested
largely upon inequality of educational opportunity resulting from invidious
racial classification."' The most that can be assumed is that the dicta of the
Japanese Relocation Cases that race is "in most circumstances irrelevant""'
and "subject to the most rigid scrutiny""' constituted one, but by far not the
most important, factor which determined the outcome of the Brown case.
Although it cannot be seriously contended that Brown answered the question
of color blindness, there is the stronger contention that the per curiam de-
11 Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
114 Contra, Note, supra note 56.
15 The equal educational opportunity factor links the Brown decision to the four prior
cases where the separate-but-equal doctrine, although not overruled, was strictly interpreted.
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S.
629 (1950); Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1949); Missouri ex rel. Gaines
v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); see Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The
Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARv. L. REV. 564, 588 (1965).
n'
1 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
"'Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
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cisions following Brown indicate an implicit adherence by the Court to a
principle of absolute prohibition of racial classifications."8 This contention
may be tested by analyzing the long struggle for desegregation and the way
the Court itself, in later cases, interpreted its first desegregation decisions.
De lure Segregation. The Warren Court was well aware that the implemen-
tation of desegregation was going to raise problems of considerable complexity.
Therefore, it shifted the responsibility for solving them to the school authorities
and delegated the supervision of the implementation to the federal district
courts, which "because of their proximity to local conditions . . . can best
perform this judicial appraisal.""' 9 The task before them was gigantic; over
ten-and-a-half million children, mostly white, were affected by the decision."
Seventeen states and the District of Columbia required segregated schools by
law, and four states permitted it, leaving the option to local authorities."'
Recalcitrance, open as well as hidden, obliged state and federal courts to face
hundreds of desegregation suits. All of the early Supreme Court desegregation
cases arose in southern school districts where, prior to 1954, segregation was
required by law. As before mentioned, in the de jure context the question is:
What does the Constitution require these states to do in order to comply with
the Brown holding? The considerable number of cases and widespread con-
fusion show the answer is not easy. Lower federal courts in the South, how-
ever, were probably less confused when they attempted to interpret the Brown
decision as narrowly as possible. The most often quoted example is certainly
the 1955 case of Briggs v. Elliot:
[T]he Supreme Court ... has not decided that the Federal Courts are to take
over or regulate the public schools of the states. It has not decided that the
states must mix persons of different races .... What it has decided, and all
that it has decided, is that a state may not deny to any person on account of
race the right to attend any school that it maintains .... The Constitution, in
other words, does not require integration. It merely forbids discrimination. [It
also forbids) the use of governmental power to enforce segregation."
There are obvious elements of the color blindness argument in this view.
All the states must do and can do is repeal the unconstitutional provisions and
laws requiring segregation-and Brown's mandate is fulfilled. There would
be no more state action, even if white children continued to attend white
schools and blacks "their" schools. They are acting, presumably, on their own
free will and "the Fourteenth Amendment is a limitation upon state or state
agencies, not.., upon the freedom of individuals.""' This kind of reasoning,
118 See notes 34-42 supra, and accompanying text.
119Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955).
1"E. SWEET, CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AMERICA 218 (1966).
"I For a detailed enumeration of the numerous constitutional and legislative provisions
requiring, permitting, or prohibiting segregation in public education, see Leflar & Davis,
Segregation in the Public Schools-1953, 67 HARV. L. REV. 377, 378-79 n.3 (1954).




coupled with similarly mitigating legislative action"' and other legal devices,'25
dominated the southern "desegregation" scene during the first decade after
Brown. The direct and obviously desired result was minimum desegregation. "
The United States Supreme Court, however, has never accepted the alleged
desegregation/integration dichotomy. Examining for the first time a specific im-
plementation plan in Goss v. Board of Education,"' the Court struck down the
minority-to-majority transfer provision of Knoxville, Tennessee, and made it
clear that racial classifications which facilitate transfer only from desegregated
to segregated schools are unconstitutional:
Classifications based on race for purposes of transfer between public schools,
as here, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ....
Not only is race the factor upon which the transfer plans operate, but also
the plans lack a provision whereby a student might with equal facility transfer
from a segregated to a desegregated school."8
Similiarly, when the Court reversed one year later the judgment of the
Fourth United States Court of Appeals that the school board of Prince Edward
County, Virginia, had not violated the equal protection clause in closing down
its public schools rather than desegregate them, it held that "grounds of race
and opposition to desegregation do not qualify as constitutional.""'
The Fifth Circuit explicitly overruled Briggs and all that it stood for in
United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education,"' thus sounding the
death knell for tokenism of all kinds. Before approving the HEW Guidelines.
as constitutional minimal standards for a free-choice desegregation program,
the court clarified some terminology: "We use the terms 'integration' and
'desegregation' of formerly segregated public schools to mean the conversion
of a de jure segregated dual system to a unitary, non-racial (nondiscriminatory)
" Shortly after the Brown decision, ten states enacted pupil placement laws, which
transferred the complete responsibility for assigning students to local school boards and
listed a variety of factors-all non-racial-which they were authorized to take into account,
such as health, morals, general welfare, size of schools, location, psychological factors, effect
on community, socioeconomic distinctions among children, etc. See Bardolph 390. For refer-
ences to the legislative enactments of the ten states, see Note, Bussing-A Permissible Tool
of School Desegregation, 49 J. URBAN L. 399, 402 n.13 (1971). Most of these statutes
were declared unconstitutional, e.g., Bradley v. School Bd., 317 F.2d 429 (4th Cir. 1963)(Virginia); Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 308 F.2d 491 (5th Cit. 1962) (Louisiana);
Northcross v. Board of Educ., 302 F.2d 818 (6th Cit. 1962) (Tennessee); Dove v. Par-
ham, 181 F. Supp. 504 (E.D. Ark.), a/I'd in part, vacated and remanded in part, 282 F.2d
256 (8th Cit. 1960).
125 Several courts held that because the school system was in transition, individual suits
were premature, e.g., Avery v. Wichita Falls School Dist., 241 F.2d 230 (5th Cit. 1956).
126 In 1964, only 3% of the southern schools were desegregated. U.S. COMMISSION ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, CLEARINGHOUSE PUBLICATION NO. 27 (1971).
1"373 U.S. 683 (1963).
"' Id. at 687-88.
"
9 Griffin v. School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 231 (1964).
130372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966), aff'd en banc, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cart. denied,
389 U.S. 840 (1967).
"1Based on title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1970), the
Office of Education established guidelines to aid local and state authorities in their desegre-
gation efforts. OFFICE OF EDUCATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WEL-
FARE, GENERAL STATEMENT OF POLICIES UNDER TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
OF 1964 RESPECTING DESEGREGATION OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS
(1965). See generally Dunn, Title VI, The Guidelines and School Desegregation in the
South, 53 VA. L. REV. 42 (1967).
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School authorities now have an affirmative constitutional duty to come
forward with a desegregation plan whose constitutionality shall be judged by
its effect: "The only school desegregation plan that meets constitutional stand-
ards is one that works."1 ' The court bluntly faced the issue of color blindness
because it realized that in some circumstances, a desegregation plan can only
work by taking into account racial criteria. The apparent legal dilemma was
resolved, again, by a result-oriented approach:
To avoid conflict with the equal protection clause, a classification that denies
a benefit, causes harm, or imposes a burden, must not be based on race. In
that sense, the Constitution is color blind. But the Constitution is color con-
scious to prevent discrimination being perpetuated and to undo the effects of
past discrimination. The criterion is the relevancy of color to a legitimate gov-
ernmental purpose.'34
If necessary, in order to fulfill its obligation to desegregate, a school board
may take into account the race of the students it has to assign. The Tenth
Circuit, shortly after Jefferson, came to the same conclusion: "[CIlearly
[a school board] may consider race in disestablishing their segregated schools
without violating the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause."3 '
Fourteen years after Brown the Supreme Court, too, began to lose patience
and adopted stronger language. Instead of merely examining desegregation
plans in the light of the broad Brown I13 standards, the Court turned towards
their result. In Green v. County School Board"" it ruled on the constitutionality
of "freedom of choice" plans. Such plans were not held unconstitutional per se,
but the Court indicated that when their effect was to perpetuate a prior system
of segregated schools they would be in violation of the Constitution. The Court
refused to go as far as the Fifth and Tenth Circuits, but it nevertheless stressed
the affirmative duty of school boards to "take whatever steps might be neces-
sary to convert a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be
eliminated root and branch.""34 On the other hand, the Court in Green did not
attempt to define positively what particular steps make a desegregation plan
constitutionally acceptable. Its message is "a negative one-that a school board
does not fulfill its duty to convert to a unitary system by substituting for a
racial criterion one that is innocent on its face."' 39 This implicitly means that
neutral color blindness cannot in all circumstances satisfy the command of
the equal protection clause as applied to public education.
In 1969 the Supreme Court had to decide whether the deliberate use of
percentage requirements in disestablishing de jure segregated schools-a step
112 372 F.2d 836, 846 (5th Cir. 1966).
"I Id. at 847.
"'Id. at 876. But see Wanner v. County School Bd., 357 F.2d 452 (4th Cir. 1966).135Dowell v. School Bd., 244 F. Supp. 971 (W.D. Okla. 1965), afl'd, 375 F.2d 158
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 931 (1967).
136 Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
"' 391 U.S. 430 (1968). See also Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450 (1968);
Raney v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 443 (1968).
138 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968).
18 Fiss, supra note 60, at 699.
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which obviously involves racial classification-is constitutional. In United
States v. Montgomery County School Board'" Justice Black, speaking for a
unanimous court, upheld the specific ratios ordered by the district court14'
because he viewed them as being not "absolutely rigid and inflexible."'' While
the ordered ratios could be enforced through a racially neutral faculty assign-
ment plan because of the relative equilibrium between white and black teachers
in the country,' the decision of where to assign teachers required a consider-
ation of their race. The same year, the Court reiterated the strong Green stand-
ard in Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education in unmistakably clear
words: "[tihe obligation of every school district is to terminate dual school
systems at once and to operate now and hereafter only unitary schools."'"
This per curiam decision is important, not so much because it reaffirmed
Green, but because it did so under the new Chief Justice Burger, whom
President Nixon had just appointed, at a time when his new Administration
announced the break with the strong civil rights policy of the Johnson Ad-
ministration. However, in the specific decree which followed the short decision,
the Court defined a unitary system as one "within which no person is to be
effectively excluded from any school because of race or color."' ' This phrase,
a variant of the color blindness rule, created much confusion. As an absolute
command of the equal protection clause, when taken out of the Alexander
context, it may very well substantially restrict and even contradict the other
command, that the school districts operate only unitary schools. In many cir-
cumstances, the latter goal can only be attained by violating the former and
vice versa. In metropolitan areas with strong residential segregation, for ex-
ample, any desegregation plan ordering bussing denies both black and white
pupils solely on the basis of race the right to attend their neighborhood
school. " Thus, in the de jure context, the crucial question to be decided by
the Supreme Court was which of the two commands had priority.
De Facto Segregation. As noted above, the tension between color blindness
and color consciousness has probably the most far-reaching impact in the
context of de facto segregation. It constitutes a serious challenge to all efforts
to compel school authorities to correct racial imbalance as well as to all
voluntary steps initiated by them to that end. A complete analysis and evalua-
tion of all the highly complicated and obscure constitutional and policy prob-
lems arising out of this context would exceed the scope of this Article.4"
In the absence of any Supreme Court decision facing directly the issue of
de facto segregation, one is left with a series of often contradictory lower court
140395 U.S. 225 (1969).
141 289 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ala.), rev'd, 400 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1968).
142 395 U.S. at 234.
14' This fact was noted in Vieira, supra note 22, at 1603-04.
144396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969).
145 Id. The same dictum has later been reiterated and emphasized by Chief Justice Burger
in his concurring opinion in Northcross v. Board of Educ., 397 U.S. 232, 237 (1970).
'41 We find here, in other words, an expression of the argument pro color-blindness, dis-
cussed earlier.
147 See Wright, supra note 65, and, especially, the extremely detailed analysis in Good-




cases, state and federal. At the outset, two situations must be distinguished:
in one, individuals-usually Negroes-attempt to compel passive school boards
to eliminate or alleviate de facto segregation; in the other, individuals-
usually, but not necessarily, white-try to prevent active school boards from
voluntarily taking such measures. The issue in the first situation is whether
school authorities have the constitutional duty to act and in the second situa-
tion, whether they have the constitutional permission to act. The courts are in
disagreement particularly as to how to decide the first issue.
In Bell v. School City of Gary it was held that the fourteenth amendment
does not require "that a school system developed on the neighborhood
school plan, and honestly and conscientiously constructed with no intention
or purpose to segregate the races, must be destroyed or abandoned because
the resulting effect is to have a racial imbalance in certain schools where the
district is populated almost entirely by Negroes or whites."'' School authorities,
in other words, are under no affirmative duty to eliminate de facto segregation
and there is no constitutional right to be integrated with persons of other
races.'49 The Tenth Circuit came to the same conclusion one year later,90 and
the First".. and Sixth"' soon followed. In the absence of any discriminatory
action of state authorities, federal courts cannot, therefore, impose upon them
an affirmative duty to correct racial imbalance by ordering, for example,
bussing of students from one district to another."'
On the other hand, as early as 1961 a lower federal court in New York
granted relief in a suit on behalf of Negro children against school authorities,
holding that the neighborhood school plans were constitutional only if they
obeyed the command of the fourteenth amendment, and that school authorities
are responsible for school segregation resulting from housing patterns if they
do nothing to mitigate the inadequacies resulting from it."4 Similarly, a consti-
tutional violation was found when school authorities were fully aware of the
almost 100 percent segregation of their district, but continued their passive
policy."' A California court went even one step farther when it held that "the
right to an equal opportunity for education and the harmful consequences of
segregation require that school boards take steps insofar as reasonably feasible
to alleviate racial imbalance regardless of its cause. ' "
The 1967 decision in Hobson v. Hansen"' is probably the most far-reaching
'4'213 F. Supp. 819, 829 (N.D. Ind.), aft'd, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964); see Kaplan, Segregation Litigation and the Schools-Part
Il: The Gary Litigation, 59 Nw. L. REV. 121 (1964).
"'Webb v. Board of Educ., 223 F. Supp. 466 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
"'Downs v. Board of Educ., 336 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1964).
5' Springfield School Comm. v. Barksdale, 348 F.2d 261 (1st Cir. 1965).
"'Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 847 (1967).
"'Bell v. School City of Gary, 213 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind. 1963).
'"Taylor v. New Rochelle Bd. of Educ., 191 F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294
F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1961). See also Branche v. Board of Educ., 204 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y.
1962).
1' Blocker v. Board of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
"'Jackson v. Pasadena School Dist., 59 Cal. 2d 876, 882, 382 P.2d 878, 882, 31 Cal.
Rptr. 606, 610 (1963).
1"269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), afi'd sub norn. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175(D.C. Cir. 1969). See also Hobson v. Hansen, 327 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1971).
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desegregation decision rendered by a federal court. Suit was brought on behalf
of black and poor white children against the school authorities of the District
of Columbia. Justice Skelly Wright ruled that de facto segregation is no less
unconstitutional than segregation by statute: "Racially and socially homogenous
schools damage the minds and spirit of all children who attend them-the
Negro, the white, the poor and the affluent-and block the attainment of
the broader goals of democratic education, whether the segregation occurs by
law or fact."1 8 He concluded that poor Negro children had been denied equal
educational opportunity and ordered several remedial measures including bus-
sing, compensatory education, and assignment of teachers on a color-conscious
basis.
The lower courts are more unanimous in dealing with suits to block active
school boards from ending de facto segregation and the issue of whether the
Constitution permits them to take voluntary measures to cure de facto racial
imbalance. That race may constitutionally be taken into account, along with
other factors, in shaping a remedy, has been held several times by state5. and
federal courts.' 0
Where state legislatures have enacted statutes barring racial imbalance
from public education, the courts have often been asked to declare them un-
constitutional on the grounds that they require school boards to classify by race.
At issue is the standard to be applied by the court: Must the state show a
compelling interest to permit school boards to use "benign" racial classifications
in order to alleviate de facto segregation, or is the test simply one of reason-
ableness? In the cases previously cited where voluntary action of school authori-
ties has been upheld, it was also held that legislators have statutory power to
prohibit racial imbalance and that such statutes violate the Constitution only
when they are arbitary or unreasonable. The same relaxed standard of review
was applied by the Supreme Court of Illinois when it had to decide upon the
constitutionality of the Illinois racial imbalance law.'0'
No court has subjected benign racial classifications to the strict standard of
review nor is there a fortiori any case adopting the view that racial classifica-
tions, whether invidious or benign, are always unconstitutional. Thus, it appears
58269 F. Supp. 401, 406 (D.D.C. 1967).
"' Vetere v. Allen, 15 N.Y.2d 259, 206 N.E.2d 174, 258 N.Y.S.2d 77, cert. denied,
382 U.S. 825 (1965); Balaban v. Rubin, 14 N.Y.2d 193, 199 N.E.2d 375, 242 N.Y.S.2d
973, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 881 (1964). But see the dissenting opinion based on the color-
blindness argument by Judge Van Voorhis, 206 N.E.2d at 176. See also Booker v. Board
of Educ., 45 N.J. 161, 212 A.2d 1 (1965); Morean v. Board of Educ., 42 N.J. 237, 200
A.2d 97 (1964); Elliot v. Board of Educ., 94 N.J. Super. 400, 228 A.2d 696 (1967);
Addabbo v. Donovan, 22 App. Div. 2d 383, afl'd, 16 N.Y.2d 619, 209 N.E.2d 112, 251
N.Y.S.2d 856, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 905 (1965).
l"°Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Bd. of Educ., 298 F. Supp. 213 (D. Conn. 1969), aff'd,
423 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1970); Olson v. Board of Educ., 250 F. Supp. 1000 (E.D.N.Y.),
appeal dismissed, 367 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1966); Offermann v. Nitkowsky, 248 F. Supp.
129 (W.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd, 378 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1967); Fuller v. Volk, 230 F. Supp.
25 (D.N.J. 1964), vacated on other grounds, 351 F.2d 323 (3d Cir. 1965). For a more
recent case, see Banks v. Muncie Community Schools, 433 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1970).
16 Tometz v. Board of Educ., 39 Ill. 2d 593, 237 N.E.2d 498 (1968). See also School
Comm. v. Board of Educ., 352 Mass. 693, 227 N.E.2d 729 (1967), appeal dismissed, 389
U.S. 572 (1968); Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm. v. Chester School Dist., 427 Pa.
157, 233 A.2d 290 (1967).
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that, in spite of its importance, the color blindness argument has not received
much explicit consideration by the courts dealing with de facto segregation.
B. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education
In Swann the Supreme Court attempted to define "in more precise terms...
the scope of the duty of school authorities and district courts in implementing
Brown I and the mandate to eliminate dual systems and establish unitary
systems at once" ' and to provide guidelines by reviewing several conflicting
plans to desegregate the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school system.
The Court reaffirmed that "the objective today remains to eliminate from
the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation."'6 3 Chief Justice
Burger then refused to accept the argument of the school authorities that
title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' was intended by Congress to restrict
the existing remedial powers of federal courts in shaping a remedy for state-
imposed segregation. The Act was interpreted to apply only to the context
of de facto segregation, an issue which the Court once more avoided: "The
basis of our decision must be the prohibition of the Fourteenth Amendment
that no state shall 'deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws.' ,,5
The Court then considered the adequacy of student assignment plans, and
divided this central issue into four major problem areas. First, the racial balance
requirement imposed by the district court was held to be within its equitable
remedial discretion because "the use made of mathematical ratios was no more
than a starting point in the process of shaping a remedy, rather than an in-
flexible requirement."'" But the Court clearly indicated that it would disap-
prove a requirement, as a matter of substantive constitutional right, of any
particular degree of racial balance or mixing." '
Second, the Court examined the constitutionality of one-race schools. Their
existence in small numbers was held not to be unconstitutional per se, but in
a system with a history of segregation, school authorities have the burden of
showing that desegregation plans which contemplate the continuing existence
of one-race schools are "genuinely nondiscriminatory."' 6 Optional and majority-
to-minority transfer provisions were upheld as "a useful part of every de-
segregation plan."''
162 402 U.S. 1, 6 (1971).
"I Id. at 15.
164" 'Desegregation' means the assignment of students to public schools and within such
schools without regard to their race, color, religion, or national origin, but 'desegregation'
shall not mean the assignment of students to public schools in order to overcome racial
imbalance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000(c) (b) (1970).
[N]othing herein shall empower any official or court of the United States to
issue any order seeking to achieve a racial balance in any school by requiring
the transportation of pupils or students from one school to another or one
school district to another in order to achieve such racial balance, or otherwise
enlarge the existing power of the court to insure compliance with constitu-
tional standards.
Id. at S 2000(c)-6(a) (1970).
165402 U.S. 1, 18 (1971).
' Id. at 25.
167 Id. at 24.
I68 d. at 26.
'
69 Id. at 27.
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The two remaining problem areas considered by the Court were remedial
altering of attendance zones, and transportation of students, both measures
involving a benign racial classification by school authorities. The constitutional
basis for permitting school authorities to assign pupils on the basis of their
race is the unconstitutionality of dual school systems."" The Court subsequently
upheld gerrymandering of district lines, pairing, clustering, and grouping of
noncontiguous school zones, as well as bussing, as permissible tools for achiev-
ing desegregation. Thus, race is no longer a constitutional taboo for school
authorities in the exercise of their affirmative duty to dismantle dual school
systems; the color blindness argument has no place in the de jure context.
Racially neutral assignment plans are no longer constitutional per se. Rather,
they may be inadequate because they "may fail to counteract the continuing
effects of past school segregation .. . ."'" The color blindness argument was
more explicitly disarmed in one of Swann's companion cases:
[T]he statute exploits an apparently neutral form to control school assignment
plans by directing that they be 'color blind'; that requirement, against the
background of segregation, would render illusory the promise of Brown v.
Board of Education .... Just as the race of students must be considered in
determining whether a constitutional violation has occurred, so also must race
be considered in formulating a remedy. To forbid, at this stage, all assignments
made on the basis of race would deprive school authorities of the one tool
absolutely essential to fulfillment of their constitutional obligation to eliminate
existing dual school systems. 7'
In other words, the constitutionality of racial classifications in the field of
public education can only be determined by looking at their result. If the
classifications produce segregation they are clearly unconstitutional, but if their
effect is to promote desegregation they are permissible.
The Court also responded to the objection mentioned above, that measures
involving benign racial classifications in favor of one group often entail dis-
crimination against another: "The remedy for such segregation may be ad-
ministratively awkward, inconvenient, and even bizarre in some situations and
may impose burdens on some: but all awkwardness and inconvenience cannot
be avoided in the interim period when remedial adjustments are being made
to eliminate the dual school systems."' Nor did the Court subject the measures
taken by the federal court to a strict standard of review simply because they
now may involve racial classifications. The test remains one of reasonableness,
and the measure of any desegregation plan is its "effectiveness"'-7 4 unfortun-
ately, a term which the Court did not define.
Finally, Swann resolved the problem created by the fact that the two com-
170 Absent a constitutional violation there would be no basis for judicially order-
ing assignment of students on a racial basis. All things being equal, with no
history of discrimination, it might well be desirable to assign pupils to schools
nearest their homes. But all things are not equal in a system that has been
deliberately constructed and maintained to enforce racial segregation.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 27.
""North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45-46 (1971). See also
McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39, 41 (1972).
'M'402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971).
74 Id. at 31; Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33 (1971).
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mands formulated in Alexander v. Board of Education'75 may often contradict
each other.7 by correcting and restating the objective: "Our objective . . .is
to see that school authorities exclude no pupil of a racial minority from any
school, directly or indirectly, on account of race .... ." However, Swan
failed to clarify many important issues, the most basic being that of de facto
segregation and the extent of government responsibility for it.
C. Color Blindness: Empirical and
Legal Arguments Contra
As the discussion above points out, the school desegregation decisions cannot
honestly be invoked to sustain the conclusion that the Constitution and the
law should be color-blind. Moreover, in the last twenty years, the argument
has too often been associated with efforts by reluctant state and school authori-
ties to thwart or to slow down the long-promised desegregation. Those who
invoke it today, at a moment when the task is still far from being accom-
plished, are at least suspect of opposing for one reason or another the desperate
attempts of minority groups to undo their chains and of denying their right
of equal access to the benefits and responsibilities of contemporary American
society. There is a presumption of bad faith against them, but it is, of course,
rebuttable.
This is not to say that the motives of those who advocate a color blindness
rule cannot be pure and even laudable. "All men are created equal" means
that all distinctions and discriminations on the basis of race, color, religion,
and the like are evil, and these bases should never be criteria for differential
treatment. We all, and particularly government, should act and think as if
there were but one race. This, of course, is a great and desirable attitude.
However, it must be remembered that "we live in a fallen world where distinc-
tions have long been made and where the effects of such distinctions persist."'7 '
The simple statement that all men are naturally equal and should be bound
together in brotherhood, irrespective of race or culture, is not very satisfactory
to the intellect, for it overlooks a factual diversity which we cannot help but
see; and we are not entitled, either in theory or in practice, to behave as if
there were no such diversity, simply because we say that it does not affect
the essence of the question . . .
Out of this observation grows a strong moral argument in favor of benign
racial classifications and compensatory treatment (and, implicitly, against
color blindness)."' Once we acknowledge that today's society is everything
but color-blind and that blacks, like many other minority groups, are still in
an inferior social and political position, we must admit that adherence to the
color blindness doctrine means justification and perpetuation of the status quo.
Furthermore-and this is one case-where history might give us some guidance
175 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
17 See text accompanying notes 145-46 supra.
177402 U.S. 1, 23 (1971).
17 Elden, supra note 15, at 651.
179 C. LtvI-STRAUSS, RACE AND HISTORY 12 (UNESCO 1952).




-since the white society has exploited the Negroes for centuries and sub-
stantially enriched itself at their expense, it is only fair to recognize their special
need and to compensate them for past inequalities. We have inherited from
our past policy of discrimination hard and complex problems which we cannot
solve simply by closing our eyes, but which require affirmative action in favor
of those who are still suffering from the continuing effects of such discrimina-
tion. Such a policy of compensation is certainly not entirely new to our social
and legal system. We accept special treatment of the handicapped, we accept
progressive taxation, we accept welfare payments, and we accept a whole
variety of social programs which give special assistance to the needy members
of our society.
An equally appealing but less emotional argument in favor of special treat-
ment is advanced by Professor Kurland.' It derives from a somewhat theoreti-
cal observation of the philosophical and constitutional basis of our institutions.
It is a basic proposition of democracy that it is the majority who speaks through
the legislator. It is also a basic proposition that the majority cannot treat the
minority as it pleases but that it must guarantee the minority equality in the
laws and before the laws-this is the essence of equal protection. The majority
is constitutionally bound, therefore, to treat the minority exactly as it treats
itself. It is evident that the majority cannot abridge the right of the minority
to be treated equally. No one can waive someone else's right. But the majority
is certainly entitled to renounce voluntarily its own right to be treated equally,
"as with almost every other constitutional right, it should be treated as waivable
by knowing affirmative action. Enactment of legislation favoring a minority
may be treated as such a waiver by the majority of its right to equal treat-
ment.""18  Thus, it follows, legislators may constitutionally pass laws which
favor a minority, and the principle of equality is not violated, even if such
laws impose burdens on individual members of the majority. If, one day, the
burdens should become too heavy or the burdened too many, the majority is
free to change their representatives in the legislative branch, which may, of
course, at any time withdraw the waiver and impose again a rule of "full"
equality.
On the other hand it is true that this argument does, at the same time, deny
the right of the courts to order such preferential treatment, because "[tjhe
Court is the voice of the Constitution; it is not the voice of the majority."'"
However, the Supreme Court will have the final word in deciding the consti-
tutionality of such legislation. It is submitted that the enabling clause of both
the fourteenth and the thirteenth amendments-as interpreted in recent cases-
could provide a valid constitutional basis for upholding these legislative enact-
ments.'"
181 Kurland, Egalitarianism and the Warren Court, 68 MICH. L. REv. 629, 674-76
(1970).182Id. at 675.
183 Id.
14With regard to the fourteenth amendment it is sufficient to recall Justice Brennan's
language in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966):
[T]he McCulloch v. Maryland standard is the measure of what constitutes
,appropriate legislation' under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Correctly
viewed, S 5 is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to
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In evaluating the argument that discrimination in favor of one group often
entails discrimination against another, and that the only solution to this legal
dilemma is a return to the color blindness rule, it must be determined what
factors-rights-are involved in each situation and a decision made as to
which of these factors are relevant to equal protection and which are not.
If, for example, a white child is denied the right to attend a school near his
home by a desegregation plan providing for crossbussing of white and black
children out of their uniracial neighborhood to integrate schools,18 5 the courts
will have to decide if a denial of the right to attend the neighborhood school,
solely because of race amounts to a denial of equal protection of the laws.188
Contending that, in the context of public education, the Supreme Court has
constantly defined equal protection to mean equality of educational opportunity,
one commentator pointed out that, therefore, "[tihe only factors ... that are
relevant to equal protection . . . are those touching upon the learning and
self-fulfillment of individual children."18 ' He concluded that absent a showing
that bussing children impairs their health or significantly impinges upon the
educational process, the "right" to attend a neighborhood school is irrelevant
to equal protection."'
One could be tempted to apply a similar technique to the situation where
legislation in favor of blacks causes conflicts between their rights and the
rights of other minority groups. For although it is undoubtedly true that
Mexican-Americans, Puerto Ricans, Indians, poor whites, and, to a lesser extent,
Orientals are generally not better off than Negroes in our society, it is equally
true that the Negroes are in a unique and hardly enviable position in this
country. They alone have been enslaved so brutally and so completely.. and
exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed
to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Similarly, the power of Congress to enforce the thirteenth amendment has been given
expansive meaning in Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), where the Court
stated that the enabling clause clothed Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and
proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States. Id. at 440-41,
quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883).
181 This is the factual situation suggested by McAuliffe, supra note 65, at 66.
188 The Courts seem to have avoided this issue. See School Comm. v. Board of Educ.,
352 Mass. 693, 700, 227 N.E.2d 729, 734 (1967), appeal dismissed, 389 U.S. 572 (1968):
"Until a pupil has been in fact excluded from a public school on account of race, we are
unimpressed with the argument that the act [the Massachusetts racial imbalance law] works
a denial of equal protection." Tometz v. Board of Educ., 39 Ill. 2d 539, 237 N.E.2d 498
(1968), is another case where race was the only factor in a school assignment plan. Fiss,
supra note 115, at 578, passed on the issue simply by saying "[j]udgment can be passed
on that situation when it arises."
"'Note, supra note 7, at 1110. See also Fiss, supra note 115, at 583. This theory suf-
fered a serious blow in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). The
Court reversed a lower court decision which invalidated the Texas system of financing public
education from local property taxes. "Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded
explicit protection under our Federal Constitution." Id. at 35.
188 See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1971): "An
objection to transportation of students may have validity when the time or distance of travel
is so great as to either risk the health of the children or significantly impinge upon the edu-
cational process."
188 Indians were the first to become slaves of white settlers during the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries but they did not adapt themselves easily to the hard work on the farms.
White convicts were then shipped from the crowded English prisons to the colonies and
became "indentured servants." But the supply could soon no longer satisfy the demand,




they alone have so long been subjected to a whole variety of repressive legis-
lation. On the other hand, as pointed out earlier, exclusion of other minority
groups from compensatory programs granted to Negroes would inevitably stir
racial tensions, and resurrect old and bitter rivalries. Moreover, besides creating
practical difficulties," t it would be totally unnecessary, for no constitutional
provision nor any other reason prevents us from extending the benefits of such
legislation to other, equally needy minority groups. At least since Swann,
benign quotas for Chicanos in the West and Southwest and for Puerto Ricans
in New York, for example, enjoy the same constitutional protection-and
the same limitations-as benign quotas for blacks.'
Finally, a practical argument against color blindness grows out of the result-
oriented approach to school desegregation adopted somewhat tentatively by the
courts in recent years. Instead of satisfying a desire for simplicity and symmetry
of constitutional doctrines by prohibiting completely any classifications based
upon race, or by permitting them all, the courts have shifted their attention
to the immediate results these produce and the effects they have upon inter-
racial relations. If they tend to perpetuate segregation, they are clearly un-
constitutional. If, however, their effect is to promote desegregation, racial
classifications, at least "as interim remedial measures"'' are admissible and
even constitute a "tool absolutely essential [for school authorities] to fulfillment
of their constitutional obligation to eliminate.., dual school systems."'' There
is, after all, a fundamental difference between racial classification as a basis
for friendly legislation which at least attempts to cure past wrongs and racial
classification which is clearly intended to confine blacks to the ghettos. In the
words of Professor Freund: "[There is an ethical sense in which discrimination
in favor of a minority is not to be equated with a discrimination against it...
if this is a sound moral judgment, it is relevant to the judgment of the law
as well as for equal protection of the law is at bottom the embodiment of a
moral standard."'
9
III. REACTIONS TO SWANN: TRENDS AND OUTLOOK
The unanimous April 20, 1971, decision of the Supreme Court has received
considerable attention by numerous commentators'.. and by divided public
100 It would be even more awkward than to define who is a Negro as opposed to white,
and frankly impossible to try to make distinctions between Negroes of African descent,
Negro Puerto Ricans, mulattoes, and between the offspring of different combinations of
these groups.
91 See 402 U.S. 1, 25 (1971).
'
91 Id. at 28.
"'North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 46 (1971). See also Goss
v. Board of Educ., 444 F.2d 632, 638 (6th Cir. 1971): "[S]ome disparate treatment in
favor of racial minorities must be tolerated until the vestiges of de jure segregation have
been eliminated."
' Freund, The Civil Rights Movement and the Frontiers of Law, in THE NEGRO AMER-
ICAN 336-37 (T. Parson & K. Clark eds. 1966).
195E.g., Cook, School Desegregation: To Brown and Back Again--The Great Circle,
23 BAYLOR L. REV. 398 (1971); Fiss, supra note 60; May, Busing, Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg, and the Future of Desegregation in the Fifth Circuit, 49 TEx. L. REV. 884(1971); Richter, supra note 7; The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARv. L. REV. 3, 74
(1971); Comment, From Brown to Swann--The New Role of Equity in Integration, 23
BAYLOR L. REV. 555 (1971); Comment, The Permissibility and Necessity of Busing School
Children To Attain Integrated Schools: Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education-A Case
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opinion. Not suprisingly, it has been both widely applauded and harshly
criticized, with characterizations ranging from "a way-station," to the adoption
of an "increasingly result-oriented" approach to school desegregation,'" to
"monster of impetuous justice. ' 197
For our purposes, it is interesting to note that, although Swann seems to
have settled the color blindness question in the de jure context, some critiques
based their objections on a color blindness rule. Absence of consideration of
the results of racial classifications and eloquent simplification of the Browli
holding characterize the following statement delivered by Senator R. C. Byrd
(West Virginia) in the U.S. Senate on September 8, 1971:
In Swann... the Court, speaking through the Chief Justice, stated that-
Absent a constitutional violation there would be no basis for judicially
ordering assignment of students on a racial basis.
Prior to the year 1954, the assignment of students on a racial basis did not
constitute a constitutional violation. But the 1954 decision in Brown against
Board of Education made it unconstitutional to assign students to public
schools on the basis of race. Now the Court, in April 1971, maintains that
if there is a constitutional violation-growing out of the previous State-
enforced system of assignment of students on the basis of race-the courts
may judicially order assignment of students on a racial basis. In other words,
two wrongs will make a right."'
Senator S. I. Ervin (North Carolina), a member of the Senate Committee on
Equal Educational Opportunity, came to the same conclusion.'
Much more serious and considerably more complicated was the strong
reaction of both the Nixon Administration and Congress against the Swan
holding that bussing is a permissible remedy for school segregation. President
Nixon requested congressional passage of two measures which were both
designed to "place firm and effective curbs on busing."2" The Student Trans-
portation Moratorium Act" would have barred all court- or HEW-ordered
bussing until July 1, 1973, or until Congress enacted the second proposed
measure, the Equal Educational Opportunities Act.' In its central provisions,
Study, 20 KAN. L. REV. 165 (1971); Note, Civil Rights v. Individual Liberty: Swann and
Other Monsters of Impetuous Justice, 5 IND. LEGAL F. 368 (1972); Note, supra note 56;
Note, supra note 124; Note, supra note 7.
'.. Fiss, supra note 60, at 704, 708.
'9€Note, Civil Rights v. Individual Liberty: Swann and Other Monsters of impetuous
Justice, 5 IND. LEGAL F. 368 (1972).
199 The speech is published under the title School Busing and Forced Integration: A Dis-
senting Opinion, in VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY, Oct. 15, 1971, at 10.
199 [The Court) says there is a duty to ignore race in assigning schools, but
when you don't ignore race in assigning children to schools, you can be re-
quired to consider race as a primary objective in assigning children to schools.
. . . That's the reason I say that in the Swann case the Supreme Court, in
effect, laid down the decision where a school board violates the equal protec-
tion clause by assigning children in schools on a nonracial basis. It can be
required by the Court to further violate the equal protection clause by assign-
ing them to schools on a racial basis.
Hearings, supra note 30, at 5407.
"11 MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES RELATIVE TO BUSING AND
EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY, H.R. DOC. No. 92-195, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
15 (1972).
20 H.R. 13916, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). The bill has never been reported by either
the House or Senate committee to which it was assigned.
22H.R. 13915, 92 Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
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the Equal Educational Opportunities Act would have prevented any court,
department, or agency of the United States from implementing a desegregation
plan for elementary students "that would require an increase.., in (1) either
the average daily distance to be traveled by, or the average time of travel"
or in (2) "the average daily number of students .. .over the comparable
averages for the preceding school year."2 ' The bill received strong support in
the House of Representatives where it passed."04 However, it did not pass the
Senate and was dropped for that year.2"
On June 23, 1972, President Nixon signed the Education Amendments of
1972' into law. This measure does not prohibit court-ordered bussing per se
but provides in its central section 803 for a postponement of implementation
of court orders requiring transfer or transportation of students "for the purposes
of achieving a balance among students with respect to race... until all appeals
in connection with such order have been exhausted or... until the time for
such appeals has expired."2"7
The proposed and partly enacted antibussing legislation raises fundamental
constitutional questions such as the separation of powers, judicial supremacy,
and the power of Congress under article III to thwart appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court and under section five of the fourteenth amendment-
"to enforce, by appropriate legislation," the equal protection clause as well as
the guarantee of due process of the fifth amendment.'m All these constitutional
principles are violated by the proposed measures, according to former Supreme
Court Justice Arthur J. Goldberg, who characterized them as "a current ex-
ample of... Parkinsonian law."2m Whether the Supreme Court will declare
them void is another question."'0
Still, opponents of bussing felt that legislation was not sufficient and pro-
.
03 Id. § 403 (a).
20 The bill passed on Aug. 17, 1972, by a vote of 282 to 102 in an amended version
which provided for even stronger restrictions on bussing that the Administration had pro-
posed. Pupil transportation was barred except to the closest or next closest school, other
remedies had to be shown to be ineffective before bussing was permitted, and all previous
bussing orders by federal courts were subjected to re-evaluation to bring about compliance
with the bill's provisions. 118 CONG. REc. H.7884 (1972).
202 After substantial parliamentary maneuvering, the bill was fillibustered to death by a
coalition of liberal Senators. Id. at S.17695.
200 Act of June 23, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235 (codified in scattered sections
of 7, 12, 16, 20, 42 U.S.C.).
207 1d. § 1653.
20. For an analysis of the constitutionality of the antibussing legislation, see Goldberg,
The Administration's Anti-Busing Proposals-Politics Makes Bad Law, 67 Nw. U.L. REv.
319 (1972); Note, Moratorium on School Busing for the Purpose of Achieving Racial
Balance: A New Chapter in Congressional Court-Curbing, 48 NoTRE DAME LAW. 208
(1972); Note, The Nixon Busing Bills and Congressional Power, 81 YALE L.J. 1542
(1972).
20. Goldberg, supra note 208, at 319, 368. See also his statements before the House
Judiciary Subcommittee on May 4, 1972. Hearings on Proposed Amendments to the Con-
stitution and Legislation Relating to Transportation and Assignment of Public School Pupils
Before Suhcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3,
at 1469 (1972).
2 0 One writer argues that because the congressional proposals are less far-reaching than
the Administration originally wanted, the Court will probably uphold the Education Amend-
ments of 1972. Note, Moratorium on School Busing for the Purpose of Achieving Racial




posed several antibussing constitutional amendments. 1' The most popular
was proposed by Representative Norman F. Lent (New York) and reads:
"No public school student shall, because of his race, creed or color be assigned
to or required to attend a particular school." '' As its sponsor declared before
a House Judiciary Subcommittee, the resolution is clearly intended to reverse
the Swann decision and to restore the rule of the Brown case which, again, is
interpreted as declaring color blindness the law of the land.2"' If adopted-
which is highly unlikely-the amendment would not only undermine all
school desegregation efforts of the last twenty years, but would, in effect, con-
stitute a return to the separate-but-equal doctrine of Plessy. Not unjustifiably,
it has already been characterized as the "Back to Jim Crow Amendment."1 "
Clearly, the proposed amendment shows how far the opponents of bussing
are willing to go, and how well the doctrine of color blindness serves their ends.
The Supreme Court, in the 1971 term, reluctantly confirmed the result-
oriented approach to school desegregation cases announced in Green and
Swann. The City of Emporia, Virginia, attempted to carve out a new district
from an existing school district which was in the process of dismantling the
dual school system. This would have resulted in a substantial increase of the
racial imbalance. The district court held that the proposed secession would
impair the desegregation process and enjoined the city from seceding."' The
Fourth Circuit overruled that decision and denied the authority of the district
court to enjoin.1  The Supreme Court, in Wright v. Council of the City of
Emporia, reversed and followed the district court in focusing on the effect of
the proposed withdrawal: "Desegregation is not achieved by splitting a single
school system operating 'white schools' and 'Negro schools' into new systems,
each operating unitary schools within its borders, where one of the two new
systems is, in fact, 'white' and the other is, in fact, 'Negro.' ,,7 However, the
four Nixon-appointed Justices felt that the Court went too far, and broke
with the rule of unanimity in school desegregation cases. 18
211 The most important is H.R.J. Res. 620, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); the most recent
are H.R.J. Res. 361, 379, 383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).22H.R.J. Res. 620, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
21" The Brown decision's mandate pioneered this policy of color blindness in the
field of education, and I believe it should continue to be retained in our law.
The principal thrust of the court, in Swann, on the other hand, is to require
the assignment of students to the public schools in this nation on the basis of
race, in order to achieve racial balances or quotas. I believe it is difficult to re-
concile these two cases. Where is the line to be drawn between allocating
people by law to schools or other institutions or facilities according to color
to promote segregation, and doing the same thing to promote integration? The
underlying principle in both cases is racism!. If it was wrong in 1954 to assign
a black child to a particular school on the basis of race, it is just as wrong to
do the same thing to other children in 1972. This 'Jim Crowism' in reverse, as
practiced by our courts, is what House Joint Resolution 620 is aimed at stop-
ping.
Rep. Norman F. Lent before the House Judiciary Subcommittee No. 5, on Mar. 2, 1972.
Hearings, supra note 209, pt. 1, at 164-65.
224 Author Harry Golden before House Judiciary Subcommittee No. 5, on Mar. 9, 1972.
Hearings, supra note 209, pt. 2, at 641.
211 Wright v. County School Bd., 309 F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Va. 1970).
2.. Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 442 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1971).
27407 U.S. 451, 463 (1972); see The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REV.
62 (1972).
211 In the companion case, United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S.
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There is a great deal of confusion in the lower courts. While the Swann
standards requiring affirmative action to dismantle dual school systems have
been followed by many courts in deciding upon the constitutionality of de-
segregation plans in the southern de jure context, 19 its limits and restrictions
are uncertain.! ° How much bussing can be required and how relevant is
previous bussing experience in determining its extent?22 ' When is a desegre-
gation plan reasonable? 2 When is a dual school system sufficiently desegre-
gated to become unitary? Who bears the burden of desegregation? These are
just a few questions which lower courts must face in the long process of
implementing the Swann standards and they deserve a more careful analysis
than is possible in this Article.
However, the Swann Court's refusal to discuss the de facto segregation issue
has raised by far the most complicated problems and has greatly divided the
courts. The classical argument announced in Bell v. School City of Gary...
has often been followed; there is no substantive constitutional right to any
particular degree of racial balance or racial mixing of pupils, and imbalance
resulting from housing patterns or other factors not resulting from deliberate
school policies does not violate the equal protection clause."
Several courts, on the other hand, have attempted to redefine this narrow
concept of state action; where racial imbalance regardless of its cause denies to
a minority group equal educational opportunities, school boards have the
constitutional duty to take steps, insofar as reasonably feasible, to alleviate it."2
5
Likewise, the Fifth Circuit seems to interpret Emporia as overruling the view
that state action is a necessary prerequisite to the establishment of a constitu-
tional violation in the field of public education.2 6
The issues decided by the two recent cases, one of which is still in cognizance
484 (1972), the four Emporia dissenters concurred on the ground that in this case the
change of school district lines would clearly produce segregation.
"' E.g., Stout v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 466 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Georgia, 466 F.2d 197 (5th Cit. 1972); Dowell v. Board of Educ., 465 F.2d 1012(10th Cir. 1972); Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 369 (5th Cit. 1972);
Kelley v. Metropolitan City Bd. of Educ., 463 F.2d 732 (6th Cir. 1972); Eaton v. New
Hanover County Bd. of Educ., 459 F.2d 684 (4th Cir. 1972); Boykins v. Fairfield Bd. of
Educ., 457 F.2d 1091 (5th Cir. 1972); Brewer v. School Bd., 456 F.2d 943 (4th Cit.
1972); Davis v. Board of Educ., 449 F.2d 500 (8th Cir. 1971), are the most recent cases.
"
0
°See Winston-Salem/Forsyth Bd. of Educ. v. Scott, 404 U.S. 1221 (Burger, Circuit
Justice), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 912 (1971), where the Chief Justice admitted that the con-
fusion was disturbing.
221 See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 30 (1971); Macon
County Bd. of Educ., 448 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1971); and particularly, Keyes v. School Dist.
No. 1, 445 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 404 U.S. 1036 (1972) (No. 71-507).
"'See Winston-Salem/Forsyth Bd. of Educ. v. Scott, 404 U.S. 1221 (Burger, Circuit
Justice), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 912 (1971).
222213 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind.), afl'd, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cit. 1963), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 924 (1964). See note 148 supra, and accompanying text.2
'
4 Lawlor v. Board of Educ., 458 F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1972); Kelly v. Guinn, 456 F.2d
100 (9th Cit. 1972); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 445 F.2d 990 (10th Cit. 1971), cart.
granted, 404 U.S. 1036 (1972) (No. 71-507).
"' Bradley v. School Bd., 338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va.), rev'd, 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir.
1972), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court, 93 S. Ct. 1952, 36 L. Ed.- 2d 771
(1973); Davis v. School Dist., 443 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 913(1972); People v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 19 Cal. App. 3d 252, 96 Cal. Rptr.
658, cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1016 (1972).t2 6 Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Ind. School Dist., 467 F.2d 142, 151 n.7 (5th Cir. 1972).
See also Gomperts v. Chase, 404 U.S. 1237 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1971).
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of the Supreme Court,"2 ' raise a series of complicated constitutional questions
directly related to the problem of color blindness. In Keyes v. School District
No. 1," the trial court found that although some Denver schools (the "core
area schools") were not segregated by state action, they provided an education
inferior to that of other Denver schools, and because "segregation, regardless
of its cause, is a major factor in producing inferior schools and unequal edu-
cational opportunity ' it ordered these schools to be desegregated. On appeal,
the Tenth Circuit held at the outset that, if consignment of minority races to
separate schools is to be allowed, "the minimum the Constitution will tolerate
is that from their objectively measurable aspects, these schools must be con-
ducted on a basis of real equality, at least until any inequalities are adequately
justified." ' However, the court was unable to find objective indicia of in-
feriority constituting a constitutional deprivation, and specifically rejected the
trial court's conclusion that segregated schools, whatever the cause, produce
lower achievement per se."' In the absence of a firm foundation upon which
to build a constitutional deprivation, it then denied the power of the federal
courts to prohibit racially segregated schools established and maintained on
racially neutral criteria, and reversed the lower court in that respect. The
remainder of the district court's decision dealing with other parts of Denver's
school system and ordering extensive bussing and compensatory education
were affirmed.
The Supreme Court, for the first time, will have to determine the scope of
the concept of state action in the field of public education. If it decides to follow
the general trend towards a broadening of the doctrine, the Court will neces-
sarily have to deal with the different remedies available to disestablish de facto
segregated school systems, many of which will involve benign racial classifica-
tions. It is submitted that if the Court is ready to extend the scope of state
action or to declare it irrelevant in the presence of unequal educational oppor-
tunities, it is highly probable that the Court will refute the color blindness
argument in the de facto context. Swann undoubtedly points in that direction.
This would mean no less than that the color blindness doctrine has no place
in the field of public education. If, on the other hand, the Court upholds the
Tenth Circuit's decision and refuses to extend the scope of the state action
doctrine, the color blindness argument will not only continue to obscure the
real issues of northern school desegregation cases, but it will gain strength
and might even successfully reappear in the de jure context.*
1" Bradley v. School Bd., 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), a/I'd per curiam by an equally
divided Court, 93 S. Ct. 1952, 36 L. Ed. 771 (1973); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 445
F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 404 U.S. 1036 (1972) (No. 71-507).
22'313 F. Supp. 61 (D. Colo. 1970).
2" Id. at 82.
220445 F.2d 990, 1004 (10th Cir. 1971).
231 Id.
* Editor's Note: On June 21, 1973, the United States Supreme Court remanded Keyes
v. School District No. 1 for a determination by the district court of whether there had been
de jure segregation practiced against the core area schools. 93 S. Ct. 2686, 37 L. Ed. 2d 548
(1973). The Supreme Court found that the district court's finding of intentional segregative
school board actions in a meaningful portion of the school system created a prima facie case
of unlawful segregated design on the part of school authorities for the entire school system.
The burden was, therefore, shifted to those authorities to prove that the core area schools
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The most recent school desegregation case decided by the Supreme Court
is Bradley v. School Board,"' where the district court ordered enforcement
of a plan integrating schools in the city with those of two adjacent counties.
That court held that where segregated residential patterns create contiguous
racially identifiable school districts, there is "state action" where a state fails
to exercise its power to consolidate those districts for purposes of student
assignment and attainment of equal educational opportunities."' On appeal,
the Fourth Circuit, which had approved the splitting of school districts of
Emporia and Scotland Neck,"4 reversed 3. and denied the lower court's author-
ity to order consolidation of school districts. The court admitted that the
finding of state action perpetuating segregation within the city and within
the adjoining counties was not clearly erroneous." However, the court found
no evidence of joint interaction between the districts for the purpose of keeping
one relatively white by confining blacks to another. Comparing the demo-
graphic patterns of Richmond to those in northern and western metropolitan
areas, the court acknowledged that it did not know "the root causes of the
concentration of blacks in the inner cities of America .... Whatever the basic
causes, it has not been school assignments, and school assignments cannot
reverse the trend."3 ' Then it deplored the housing segregation, but refused
to consider it as state action by repeating the Swann dictum that "one vehicle
can carry only a limited amount of baggage."" The last vestiges of state-
imposed segregation having been eliminated from the public schools in the
three districts, it concluded that there was no constitutional violation and that
the district court had exceeded its remedial powers.
Again, the issue before the Supreme Court was the scope of the concept
of state action. Here, unlike Keyes, the state had a long history of de jute
segregation. If the Court, like the majority in Emporia, had considered the
effect of the proposed change of district lines on desegregation, it could well
have subscribed to the finding of the trial court that consolidation of the three
school districts would result in a "viable racial mix '""' of twenty to forty
percent black students in each school, 40 a quota which seems to correspond
to the demographic pattern of the three units combined. But on May 21, 1973,
were not the result of intentionally segregative actions even though the core area schools
should be viewed independently.
It is also significant that the Court found that for purposes of defining a "segregated"
school, Negroes and Hispanos must be placed in the same category.
2" 338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va.), rev'd, 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), af'd per curiam
by an equally divided Court, 93 S. Ct. 1952, 36 L. Ed. 2d 771 (1973).
2"3338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va. 1972).
" United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 442 F.2d 575 (4th Cir. 1971),
rev'd, 407 U.S. 484 (1972); Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 442 F.2d 570(4th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
135462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972).211 Id. at 1065.
2 1 Id. at 1066.
238 Id.
2" The term was defined by an expert as "a racial mix that is well enough established
that it will continue to prosper, ... a desirable, reasonable mix for educational purposes."
Id. at 1062.
" The trial court rejected the view that the percentage could be characterized as the
imposition of a fixed racial quota and explained that a percentage below 20% would take
the character of a token presence; one above 40% would probably pass the "tipping point"
and result in rapid resegregation because of "white flight." Id. at 1063.
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the Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's decision by an equally divided
Court, Justice Powell abstaining. 4' What could well have been a landmark
decision representing a new step towards the solution of the northern and
metropolitan de facto segregation problem became a simple tie vote, which
sets no precedent for other courts to follow. What the decision does indicate,
however, is that the era of unanimous school desegregation cases is over.
While the remaining Warren Court members continue to adhere to the spirit
of Brown and its progeny, and to adapt it to new fact situations, the four
Nixon appointees somewhat stubbornly refuse to expand its impact, not want-
ing the Supreme Court to take an active part in the highly politicized debate
over de facto school segregation.
In 1971 the Supreme Court of California decided, in a landmark case,'"
that a school financing system that relies substantially upon local property
taxes, which results in inequalities of spending by school districts, discriminates
against students in poorer school districts and violates the equal protection
clause. Several lower courts followed this ruling. 4' But the Supreme Court,
on March 21, 1973, explicitly overruled such a decision in San Antonio Inde-
pendent School District v. Rodriguez.'" The majority, formed by Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Powell, Stewart, Blackmun, and Rehnquist, refused to
examine the Texas local property tax school financing system under standards
of strict judicial scrutiny. Since it could find no showing that such a system
discriminates against a definable class of poor people nor that it results in the
absolute deprivation of education, it concluded that "the Texas system does
not operate to the peculiar disadvantage of any suspect class."'' Of greater
importance, the Court held that the system does not interfere with the exercise
of a fundamental right or liberty. Appellees had insisted that education is
itself "a fundamental personal right because it is essential to the effective
exercise of First Amendment freedoms and to intelligent utilization of the
right to vote.''2" But the Court was not impressed by this argument and, after
expressing the view that "it is not the province of this Court to create sub-
stantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection
of the laws,' 4 bluntly stated: "Education, of course, is not among the rights
afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find
any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected."'" For these reasons, the
Court rejected the test of strict judicial scrutiny, and merely examined whether
the Texas system bears some reasonable relationship to a legitimate state
purpose, which it easily found. Consequently, it held that there was no viola-
tion of the equal protection clause.
'4Bradley v. School Bd., 93 S. Ct. 1952, 36 L. Ed. 2d 771 (1973).
11'Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
'"See, e.g., Rodriguez v. San Antonio Ind. School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex.
1971); Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971); Milliken v. Green,
389 Mich. 1, 203 N.W.2d 457 (1973); Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d
187 (1972).
2"411 U.S. 1 (1973).
m Id. at 28.
24 Id. at 35.




Justices White, Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall dissented. In the words
of the latter, the majority's opinion "can only be seen as a retreat from our
historic commitment to equality of educational opportunity and as unsupport-
able acquiescence in a system which deprives children in their earliest years
of the chance to reach their full potentials as citizens."'
Rodriguez is not a case directly involving racial discrimination. However,
in holding that education is not among the limited rights guaranteed by the
Constitution, the Court may have created a basis for a later holding that the
means used to achieve the goal of racially desegregated education, such as
bussing or even assignment of pupils on a racial basis in the de facto context,
would occasion an unprecedented upheaval in public education and, therefore,
be unconstitutional. Since the Court is so badly split on its recent interpretations
of the equal protection clause and since the temptation seems to be growing
to avoid a thorough analysis of the increasingly complex aspects of public
school desegregation cases by subscribing to a simplifying general doctrine,
a return to a color blindness rule by the Court can no longer be excluded.
IV. CONCLUSION
Emotions are an important and even essential part of politics. They stimulate
public concern for political issues and induce people to take an active part
in the political organization of society. But once aroused, they often tend to
be exaggerated and lend themselves easily to deliberate manipulations for
various ends. At some point, they not only obscure the very issue which created
them but prevent a rational analysis of related, not less important issues.
Artificially nourished emotionalism decreases understanding and can be used
to avoid the problems rather than to solve them.
Since education is considered an indispensable prerequisite for personal
success, all problems relating to it are particularly wrought with emotion.
Failure or success in educational institutions is often identified with undisput-
able qualities as a human being. It is not surprising, therefore, that when
sensitive racial issues are combined with educational problems, emotions grow
wild. The massive and often violent oppositions to desegregation and, in recent
years, to bussing are good examples of how irrational emotionalism can hide
the real problem. The real problem is not desegregation and is not bussing,
but is the conviction that black schools are inherently inferior because Negroes,
by their very nature or because of their economic, social, or cultural environ-
ment, are less capable of learning than are whites. Therefore, integration of
schools necessarily must result in a decline of quality.
The color blindness argument is not the central problem with school deseg-
regation. It arose as a legitimate response to an overwhelmingly invidious
color consciousness and was originally clearly directed against racial discrimina-
tion that deprived Negroes of equal social, political, and legal rights. But
because of its appealing simplicity it has quickly been distorted and interpreted
as embodying a "neutral" and "objective" approach to racial problems. In the
present decisive phase of school desegregation, with the fundamental question
2"Id. at 71.
(Vol. 27
1973) PUBLIC SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 489
of the validity of the de jure/de facto dichotomy remaining undecided, ad-
herence to a neutral color blindness rule means uncritical justification and
deliberate perpetuation of the status quo.
One could venture to compare the role the color blindness doctrine played
in the long and bitter history for school desegregation with the one played by
the "state rights" arguments of the Tenth Amendment throughout the entire
history of the United States. Both have too often been advanced to cover
numerous inequalities and flagrant injustices of a given status quo. The rele-
vance of both to a particular issue is greatly obscured by the many emotions
they have raised. This is unfortunate because it would be an oversimplification
to contend that neither of them can ever be justified.
An attempt has been made to neutralize the emotional aspects of the color
blindness doctrine by putting it, each time it appears, into its historical and
sociological context. It is left, therefore, to the reader to judge its relevance
to public school desegregation.
